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In light of Canada’s need to deal with respiratory infectious diseases such as 
tuberculosis, Avian Influenza and severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), public 
health departments across the country have been challenged with the need to develop 
action plans for both treatment and prevention. Yet the problem is not isolated to Canada 
but is considered to be a major public health threat both in Canada and internationally. 
The emergence of viral respiratory infections in Canada may be attributed to several 
sources, which include migration from one part of the world to another either for 
pleasure or business, as a major contributor. Such migrations coupled with inadequate 
infectious disease prevention strategies not only leads to rapid transmission of respiratory 
infectious diseases, but there is also a problem in administering effective treatment and 
vaccines to infected cohorts.Several factors contribute to both the accidental and/or 
deliberate transfer of microbial agents. For example, economic, cultural and political 
interactions invoke the emergence of new and unrecognized microbial disease agents 
(Lashley, 2006). New diseases have the potential to spread across the world in a matter of 
days, or even hours, making early detection and action more important than ever 
(BCCDC, 2008). 
Avian Influenza (AI) is a contagious viral infection caused by the Influenza virus 
Type “A”. Avian Influenza can affect several species of birds, some of which are 
consumed by humans (e.g. chickens, guinea fowl, quails,and turkeys), others are 
domesticated pets, and others are wild. Avian Influenza viruses can be classified into two 
categories based on the severity of the illness caused in birds: 
• low pathogenicity (LPAI) 
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• high pathogenic (HPAI)(CFIA, 2009). 
Pathogenicity refers to the severity of the illness (CFIA, 2009, Shah, 2003). Avian 
Influenza viruses are classified by type and subtype. For example considering the H5N1 
virus type, the letters H and N refer to surface proteins, hemagglutinin (H) and 
neuraminidase (N), on the Influenza virus. The H5N1 strain is a subtype of Avian 
Influenza that has been linked to most of the cases found worldwide (CDC, n.d). 
Outbreaks of highly pathogenic H5N1 Avian Influenza in Southeast Asia, Europe and 
Africa have led to devastating consequences for poultry, and have been suggested to 
cause infections in humans. Although these infections from the animal reservoir continue 
to accumulate, the virus does not seem to spread extensively among humans. However, a 
process of genetic reassortment could occur in a human who is co-infected with Avian 
Influenza A virus and a human strain of Influenza A virus. The resulting new virus might 
then be able to easily infect humans and spread from human to human (Iwami, Takeuchi 
& Liu, 2008). 
The transportation of domestic poultry and wild birds throughout various market 
places and market types worldwide is considered one of the vectors of outbreak 
transmission (Dinh, Long, Tien et al., 2006). Recently the Avian Influenza has led federal 
inspectors to cull, gas and compost about 60,000 birds on a Fraser Valley poultry farm in 
British Columbia. These were found to be subtype H5N2, and likely low in pathogenicity 
(CFIA, 2009). In Canada, Avian Influenza is a reportable disease under the Health Of 
Animal Regulations and all cases must be reported to the Canadian Food Inspection 
Agency (CFIA, 2009).The Canadian food inspection agency is in charge of laws 
regulating movement of food items and livestock in and out of Canada. Yet an important 
5 
6 
question still arise which is: How effective is this Avian Influenza surveillance process 
within Canada? 
The severe acute respiratory syndrome crisis (SARS) demonstrated that there 
may be serious deficiencies in Canada’s public health system, with specific regard to the 
spread of infection. A rapid spread of SARS across the world and eventually to Canada 
lead to a high incidence rate for morbidity and mortality. The presence of the virus in 
Canada alerted public health officials to the inadequate preparedness of Canada in terms 
of outbreak prevention strategies. 
Responding to disease outbreaks are part of the protective role of the public health 
agency. A coherent plan that includes a rapid and effective response will reduce 
incidence rates for morbidity, mortality and potential years of life lost (PYLL). Likewise, 
an effective prevention strategy will also have a better cost-benefit outcome than treating 
the diseases/ infections when it has already occurred. 
The major tenet of an effective public health care system is to prevent diseases 
that will be a reduction in the need to treat outcomes. There is an old saying “Prevention 
is better than cure”(a quote from the goddess Hygiene; Loefler (2004). Shah (2003) strongly 
believes in prevention. Primary prevention aims at preventing disease before it occurs, 
thereby reducing the incidence (Shah, 2003). Preventive measures such as vaccines were 
developed to ensure that infection rates are minimized. Adopting healthy lifestyle 
behaviours not only ensure reductions in diseases such as cardiovascular and respiratory 
diseases, but specific lifestyle behaviours can also reduce the rate and spread of infectious 
diseases. 
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Following the SARS epidemic in Canada, there was an explicit campaign by 
public health agencies to increase awareness of the benefits of hand washing, covering a 
cough or a sneeze with a tissue, and getting vaccinated before the typical flu season 
starts. 
Yet there have also been noted cases of transmission of infections from patients to 
patients via health care workers due to breaks in aseptic techniques, reduced frequency of 
hand washing among health care workers before and between caring for patients, and 
decreased attention to infection control practices which include a lack of use of protective 
devices such as gloves, face masks, isolation gowns, using equipments such as 
thermometer, stethoscopes, otoscopes from patient to patient without using proper aseptic 
techniques. (Manning, Archibald, Bell, et al., 2001; de Vries, Baas, van der Ploeg, 2006). 
In the following document, a review of Avian flu will be presented with emphasis 
on: 
• Vectors, modes of viral transmission, prevention and treatment, 
• Epidemiology, 
• Clinical features, 
• Public health programs in Canada will be reviewed and 
recommendations will be made on how to improve these programs as well 
as how awareness of Avian flu can be made to the public so as to increase 
vigilance and early reporting of Avian flu, thereby decreasing the 
morbidity and mortality of a potential pandemic. 
Public health programs are in place to fight Avian Influenza . Despite the different 
measures Canada has organized to reduce the rate of infection from Avian Influenza, 
8 
cases of Avian Influenza are still being reported in different parts of Canada. While 
Canada is prepared against Avian Influenza outbreak, some challenges still exist that 
need to be addressed .This paper will review these challenges and make reccomendations. 
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2: Review of literature for Avian Influenza 
2:1 Vectors, modes of transmission, prevention and treatment of Avian 
Influenza 
Avian Influenza has been commonly referred to as "bird flu"( WHO, 2006a; 
CDC, n.d). Wild birds are vectors but usually do not show clinical symptoms (WHO, 
2006a). One strain of Avian Influenza, the H5N1 virus, is endemic in much of Asia and 
has spread into parts of Europe and Africa (Pandemic flu, n.d; CDC, n.d, WHO 2006a). 
Most human cases of H5N1 infection were associated with the direct handling of infected 
poultry, slaughtering or preparing sick poultry for consumption, consumption of 
uncooked poultry products such as raw blood, or close contact with live poultry 
(Chotpitayasunondh, Ungchusak, Hanshaoworakul et al .,2004; Dinh, Long, Tien et al., 
2006; Tran, Nguyen, Nguyen et al., 2004; WHO, 2006). 
Influenza A viruses are enveloped RNA viruses with an eight-segmented, single- 
stranded, negative-sense genome belonging to the family Orthomyxoviridae. Influenza 
virus type A (and type B) causes recurrent epidemics almost every year, leading to 
significant human morbidity and mortality. However, only Influenza A virus is associated 
with Influenza virus pandemics, where an antigenically novel Influenza virus emerges to 
spread rapidly worldwide in an immunologically naive population (Peiris, de Jong, & 
Guan, 2007). The segmented genome allows Influenza A viruses from different species 
to mix and create a new Influenza A virus if viruses from two different species infect the 
same person or animal (reassortment). Antigenic shift results when a new Influenza A 
subtype to which most people have little or no immune protection infects humans. If this 
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new virus causes illness in people and can be transmitted easily from person to person, an 
Influenza pandemic can occur. (CDC, n.d). 
Avian Influenza A viruses may be transmitted from animals to humans in two main 
ways: 
• Directly from birds or from Avian virus-contaminated environments to 
people (CDC, n.d, PAHO 2004, Gill et al., 2006, Gilsdorf et al., 2006, 
Rimmelzwaan et al., 2006, Songserm et al., 2006, Wong and Yuen 2006, 
Gu et al., 2007). Bird-to-human transmission of the Avian Influenza virus 
is likely by the oral-fecal route (Thomas & Noppenberger, 2007). 
• Through an intermediate host, such as a pig ( CDC, n.d; Ludwig, Stitz & 
Planz, 1995). 
Antigenic drift and antigenic shifts have been linked to most previous cases of 
Influenza pandemics. Antigenic drift refers to small, gradual changes that occur through 
point mutations in the two genes that contain the genetic material to produce the main 
surface proteins, hemagglutinin and neuraminidase. These point mutations occur 
unpredictably and result in minor changes to these surface proteins. Antigenic drift 
produces new virus strains that may not be recognized by antibodies to earlier Influenza 
strains. This process works as follows: a person infected with a particular Influenza virus 
strain develops antibody against that strain. As newer virus strains appear, the antibodies 
against the older strains might not recognize the "newer" virus, and infection with a new 
strain can occur. This is one of the main reasons why people can become infected with 
Influenza viruses more than one time and why global surveillance is critical in order to 
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monitor the evolution of human Influenza virus stains for selection of which strains 
should be included in the annual production of Influenza vaccine (CDC, n.d). 
Antigenic shift refers to an abrupt, major change to produce a novel Influenza A 
virus subtype in humans that was not currently circulating among people (see more 
information below under Influenza Type A and Its Subtypes). Antigenic shift can occur 
either through direct animal (poultry)-to-human transmission or through mixing of human 
Influenza A and animal Influenza A virus genes to create a new human Influenza A 
subtype virus through a process called genetic reassortment. Antigenic shift results in a 
new human Influenza A subtype(CDC, nd). 
Human Influenza is transmitted by inhalation of infectious droplets and droplet 
nuclei, by direct contact, and perhaps, by indirect (fomite) contact, with self-inoculation 
onto the upper respiratory tract or conjunctival mucosa (Salgado, Farr, Hall & Hayden 
2002; Bridges, Kuehnert & Hall 2003). Although most human infections by Avian 
Influenza viruses are attributable to exposure to infected poultry, human infections 
resulting from exposure to Avian Influenza viruses from wild birds have been 
documented from Eurasia (H5N1: Azerbaijan), North America (HI IN9: United States), 
and Afnca (H10N7: Egypt) (PAHO 2004, Gill et al., 2006, Gilsdorf et ah, 2006). 
Human-to-human transmission has been documented for H5N1 and H7N7 Avian 
Influenza viruses (Bridges et al. 2000, du Ry van Beest Holle et al., 2005, Unguchusak et 
al., 2005), and human-to-human transmission of an H7N2 Avian Influenza virus may 
have occurred during a May 2007 outbreak in the United Kingdom (DEFRA 2007 a,b). 
Oseltamivir (Tamiflu) and Zanamivir (Relenza) have proven efficacy as seasonal 
or postexposure prophylaxis against human Influenza virus (Mayoclinic website, n.d; 
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Nicholson, Wood & Zambon. 2003; ASHP, 2008). Chemoprophylaxis with 75 mg of 
oseltamivir once daily for 7 to 10 days is warranted for persons who have had a possible 
unprotected exposure (Hayden, Belshe, Villanueva, et ah, 2004; Welliver, Monto, 
Carewicz, et ah, 2001). The use of preexposure prophylaxis warrants consideration if 
evidence indicates that the Influenza A (H5N1) strain is being transmitted from person to 
person with increased efficiency or if there is a likelihood of a high-risk exposure (e.g., an 
aerosol-generating procedure) (WHO Writing committee, 2005). Offering prophylactic 
treatment to families of infected patients and health care personnels may help prevent 
outcome of Avian Influenza by stopping the spread of the flu virus in the body. 
Oseltamivir and Zanamivir help shorten the time you have flu symptoms such as a stuffy 
or runny nose, sore throat, cough, muscle or joint aches, tiredness, headache, fever, and 
chills (ASHP, 2008). Prophylactic treatment with oseltamivir has been offered to 
potentially exposed individuals during the poultry outbreaks of H7N7 and H7N3 viruses 
in The Netherlands and Canada, respectively (Tweed, Skowronski, David et al., 2004; 
Koopmans, Wilbrink, Conyn , 2004 ). Oseltamivir is used to treat Avian flu in adults and 
children (older than 1 year of age) who have had symptoms of the flu for no longer than 2 
days. Zanamivir on the other hand is used in adults and children at least 7 years of age. 
Both drugs belong to the class of medications called neuraminidase inhibitors. 
Oseltamivir will not prevent bacterial infections, which may occur as a complication of 
the flu (AHFS, 2008). 
The Food and Drug Administration approved the first human vaccine to prevent 
infection with one strain of H5N1 bird flu virus in April 2007. When tested, the bird flu 
vaccine fully protected only about 45 percent of those vaccinated but still may help 
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reduce the severity of the disease and decrease the risk of hospitalization and death in 
those who aren't fully protected. Other preventive methods of the Avian flu include: 
avoiding domesticated birds, avoiding open-air markets, washing hands properly, avoid 
substances made with raw eggs, cleaning and disinfection of environmental surfaces, use 
of gloves and protective attire, covering nose and mouth while coughing, not sharing 
dishes and cutleries used in eating (CDC, n.d; Mayoclinic website, n.d). As far as 
handling poultry is concerned, poultry should be well cooked reaching a minimum 
temperature of about 165° F (74° C), and hands properly washed and disinfected after 
handling poultry ( Mayoclinic website, n.d). 
2:2 Clinical features of Avian Influenza 
Initial symptoms of avain Influenza include a high fever, usually with a 
temperature higher than 38° C, and Influenza-like symptoms (WHO, 2006a, Burnet 
institute, 2005). In many patients, the disease caused by the H5N1 virus follows an 
unusually aggressive clinical course, with rapid deterioration and high fatality (WHO, 
2006a). Human infections with most Avian Influenza viruses have been shown to 
typically involve mild symptoms and non-contagious infections. On the other hand, fatal 
human disease and human-to-human transmissions have been confirmed from persons 
infected with Avian Influenza viruses of the H5N1 and H7N7 subtypes (Chan 2002, 
Koopmans, Wilbrink, Conyn, et al., 2004, du Ry van Beest Holle , Meijer, Koopmans et 
al., 2005, Ungchusak, Auewarakul, Dowell et al., 2005, Kandun , Wibisono, 
Sedyaningsih et al., 2006, Yang et al., 2007, WHO 2008.). 
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Some manifestations of Avian Influenza have been from mild conjunctivitis to 
fatal systemic disease and multiorgan failure, including severe or fatal respiratory, 
gastrointestinal, or neurological syndromes ((WHO, 2006a, de Jong and Hien 2006, 
Sandrock & Kelly 2007, Abdel-Gafar Chotpitayasunondh, Gao, et al., 2008). 
Lower respiratory tract manifestations develop early in the course of illness and are 
usually found at presentation (WHO, 2006a; Chotpitayasunondh, Ungchusak, 
Hanshaoworakul, et al.2004). In one series, dyspnea (shortness of breath) developed a 
median of 5 days after the onset of illness (range, 1 to 16) (Chotpitayasunondh, 
Ungchusak, Hanshaoworakul, et al., 2004). Almost all patients have clinically apparent 
pneumonia (Chotpitayasunondh, Ungchusak, Hanshaoworakul, et al, 2004, Brunet 
institute, 2005; WHO, 2006a). Progression to respiratory failure has been associated with 
diffuse, bilateral, ground-glass infiltrates and manifestations of the acute respiratory 
distress syndrome (ARDS) (Fouchier, Schneeberger, Rozendaal et al., 2004; WHO, 
2006a). Multiorgan failure with signs of renal (kidney) dysfunction and sometimes 
cardiac compromise, including cardiac dilatation (an increase in the size of the cavities of 
the heart) and supraventricular tachyarrhythmias (characterized by rapid, irregular heart 
beats associated with an atrial rate of a 100 or more a minute), have been common (Chan, 
1997; Tam 2002; Chotpitayasunondh, Ungchusak, Hanshaoworakul, et al., 2004; Hien, 
Liem, Dung et al., 2004; Burnet Institute, 2005). Other complications have included 
ventilator-associated pneumonia, pulmonary hemorrhage (bleeding into the lung tissues), 
pancytopenia (reduction in red/white blood cells and platelets as a result of the disease 
affecting the bone marrow), pneumothorax (collapsed lungs), Reye’s syndrome ( a 
potentially fatal disease that causes numerous detrimental effects to many organs. 
14 
15 
especially the brain and liver; it is associated with aspirin consumption by children with 
viral diseases), and sepsis syndrome (is a complex systemic inflammatory condition 
associated with infection) without documented bacteremia (presence of bacteria in the 
blood) (Yuen, Chan, Peiris et ah, 1998; Tran , Nguyen, Nguyen et ah, 2004; Beigel, 
Farrar, Han et ah, 2005; Chotpitayasunondh , Ungchusak, Hanshaoworakul et ah, 2005). 
2.3 Epidemiology 
The epidemiological characteristics of the H5N1 virus in humans have changed 
significantly since the time of the 1997 Hong Kong epizootic, with higher observed rates 
of morbidity and mortality occurring among children and adolescents recorded in 
laboratory confirmed cases reported since 2003 (Tran et al. 2004, Chotpitayasunondh et 
al. 2005, Areechokchai et al. 2006, WHO Regional Pacific Office 2007). 
According to the Weekly Epidemiological Record published online by WHO (2006a) 
from the first analysis of epidemiological data on all 205 laboratory-confirmed H5N1 
cases officially reported to WHO by onset date from December 2003 to 30 April 2006, 
• The overall case-fatality rate was highest in 2004 (73%), followed by 63% to date 
in 2006, and 43% in 2005. 
• The overall case-fatality rate was 56%. Case fatality was high in all age groups 
but was highest in persons aged 10 to 39 years. 
• Half of the cases occurred in people under the age of 20 years; 90% of cases 
occurred in people under the age of 40 years. 
• The case-fatality profile by age group differs from that seen in seasonal Influenza, 
where mortality is highest in the elderly. 
15 
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This skew in age distribution is not explainable by the population-age structure of the 
affected countries (Smallman-Raynor & Cliff, 2007). The unusual age distribution of case 
incidence and case fatality may reflect age-related patterns of exposure or risk behavior 
(e.g., close contact with sick poultry) or age-related host resistance (Peiris, de Jong & 
Guan’ 2007). Significant numbers of family clusters were reported among the human 
H5N1 cases (Olsen, Ungchusak, Sovann et ah, 2005; Kandun, Wibisono, Sedyaningsih et 
ah, 2005; Beigel, Farrar, Han et ah, 2005; WHO, 2006b). It is difficult to ascertain 
whether these clusters represent infection from a common environmental source or 
limited human-to-human transmission. Excluding a common source of infections is 
epidemiologically exceedingly difficult, and only unusual circumstances allow 
unequivocal proof of this (Ungchusak Auewarakul, Dowell et al., 2005). The frequencies 
of human infection have not been determined, and seroprevalence studies are urgently 
needed (Peiris, de Jong & Guan, 2007). The largest number of cases so far has been 
reported in Indonesia, followed by Vietnam, Egypt, China, Thailand and other countries 
(WHO, 2009). See table 1 for more details. 
Taken overall, it appears that while exposure to a source of H5N1 infection is 
necessary, such exposure alone is not sufficient to explain the observed epidemiology of 
H5N1 disease. Other as-yet-undetermined factors appear to be crucial in determining who 
gets infected and ill. Among other possibilities, the role of host genetic susceptibility 
factors and hitherto-unrecognized host resistance mechanisms deserve investigation 
(Sandbulte, Jiminez, Boon et al., 2007). 
16 
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Table l:Cumulative Number of Confirmed Human 
Cases of Avian Influenza A/(H5N1) Reported to WHO. 
(WHO, 2009). 
2 March 2009 
Total number of cases includes number of deaths. 
WHO reports only laboratory-confirmed cases. 
All dates refer to onset of illness. 
17 
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3. Public health programs in Canada to fight Avian Infiuenza 
The World Health Organization (WHO) considers the Avian Influenza A/H5N1 
virus a public health risk with pandemic potential. The next human Influenza pandemic, 
if caused by the Avian Influenza A/H5N1 virus, is estimated to have a potential mortality 
rate of more than a hundred million (Thomas &Noppenberger, 2007). Avian Influenza 
has become a global problem that needs a global response. Canada has provided strong 
and influential leadership in the global response to Avian and pandemic Influenza. Avian 
Influenza threatens the health of humans and animals, as well as our global economy. 
More recent commitments have taken a more global approach and have focused on 
strengthening the capacity of key multilateral organizations to prepare for and respond to 
Avian/pandemic Influenza around the world (CIDA, n.d). There are 43 total quarantined 
premises reported in Canada as of February 2009 (CFIA, 2009), but no human cases have 
been reported yet, nevertheless, public health authorities are taking precautionary 
measures as warranted. 
Programs in place to fight against Avian flu include: 
• Health Canada's Global Public Health Intelligence Network (GPHIN), 
managed by the Centre for Emergency Preparedness and Response. This is a 
primary source of information for the WHO as well as international governments 
and other non-govemment public health organizations. GPHIN is an internet- 
based, early warning system that gathers preliminary media reports of public 
health significance 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. The information is filtered, 
analyzed and made available to subscribers. Notifications about public health 
events that may have serious public health consequences are immediately 
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forwarded to users. GPHESf is currently being enhanced to offer service in all six 
WHO official languages (Arabic,English, French, Russian, Simplified Chinese 
and Spanish). It was the GPHIN system that first identified an unusual outbreak of 
pneumonia, later identified as SARS, as it was emerging in southern China 
(PHAC, 2003b). 
• Health Canada has a comprehensive national surveillance system for 
Influenza, established in the 1996-1997 Influenza season. Laboratory 
surveillance for respiratory viruses has been in place since 1993. 
Surveillance information and alerts are communicated to Canada's public 
health community via disease surveillance networks such as the Influenza 
surveillance system “FluWatch”( PHAC, 2003b) 
• The Quarantine Act and regulations enable Health Canada's quarantine 
officers to institute a range of screening and detention measures at airports 
and ports, including the following: -detaining people and goods in order to 
conduct medical examinations, analysis of goods or inspection of 
conveyances; -requiring airline carriers to distribute health information 
materials and conduct active screening of travellers en route, before 
departure and after arrival ( PHAC, 2003b). Quarantine services are 
located at the Toronto, Vancouver, Montreal (Pierre Elliot Trudeau), 
Calgary, Edmonton, Halifax and Ottawa international airports. 
• Travel advisories: Health Canada's Travel Medicine Program provides 
information for people travelling outside Canada and for travel, medicine 
professionals who provide advice to international travellers. Travel 
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medicine information can be accessed 24 hours a day through the Internet 
and offers details on international disease outbreaks, immunization 
recommendations, general health advice for travellers, the location of 
travel clinics in Canada, and disease-specific treatment and prevention 
guidelines (PHAC, 2003b). 
• Canada Food and Inspection agency (CFIA) regulations on the import 
ofpoultry products from other countries: These regulations are enforced 
through port-of-entry inspections. In the event of an outbreak of a foreign 
animal disease, the goal of the Agency's emergency response is to prevent 
further spread of the disease and protect animal health. In an AI outbreak, 
the CFIA would employ a "stamping out" policy in an effort to eradicate 
the disease. Actions include: humane destruction of all infected and 
exposed animals; -surveillance and tracing of potentially infected or 
exposed poultry; -strict quarantine and controls on movement of poultry; 
and thorough decontamination of infected premises (CFIA, 2008). Canada 
can regain its disease-free status and resume normal trade in poultry 
products three months after the disease control operations are completed 
and AI has been eradicated (CFIA, 2009) 
• Bird Health Basics led by the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA), 
are simple steps that owners of backyard flocks and pet birds can take to 
help protect their birds from dangerous diseases, such as Avian Influenza 
and exotic Newcastle disease (CFIA, 2008) 
20 
21 
• Health Canada's Respiratory Illness Outbreak Response Protocol 
outlines basic roles and responsibilities, general principles and operating 
procedures agreed upon by the federal, provincial and territorial 
governments. This will help ensure coordinated efforts around 
investigation and control of severe respiratory illness outbreaks in Canada 
that have international and multi-jurisdictional implications (PHAC, 
2003b) 
• Health Canada gathers infectious disease intelligence from a variety of 
sources. Reports are received from the WHO, the CDC, ministries of 
health in other countries, and provincial and territorial reports. Health 
Canada's infectious disease programs perform daily scans of information 
published by international surveillance systems( PHAC, 2003b). 
• Canadian centre for occupational health and safety website has 
information for pandemic preparedness for the home, work place and 
communities. 
• National Emergency Stockpile System (NESS). The NESS contains 
everything that you would expect to find in a hospital, from beds and 
blankets and a supply of pharmaceuticals. This includes a stockpile of 
antiviral medication (PHAC, n.d). 
• Real-time alert system for serious respiratory illnesses (SRIs), 
including SARS and Avian Influenza, to ensure timely dissemination of 
information to the provinces and territories (PHAC, n.d). 
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• Hospital-based surveillance system to detect cases and clusters of severe 
or emerging respiratory infections and to effectively prevent and contain 
their spread in acute care facilities (PHAC, n.d). 
• Establish a contract for pandemic vaccine production. Canada is the first 
country worldwide to plan for a secure vaccine supply through the 
contracting of a domestic supplier (PHAC, n.d). 
4. Recommendations to overcome challenges faced in the prevention, 
treatment and eradication of Avian Influenza 
Despite the current measures Canada has in place to reduce the current incidence 
of Avian Influenza and other respiratory infectious diseases, the Avian Influenza 
continues to exist in poultry in Canada. The virus has not been eradicated worldwide and 
therefore its presence signifies the challenges we face in preventing and controlling 
Avian Influenza outbreaks in Canada. 
Some countries may be better prepared to fight Avian Influenza than others. 
However it appears that the best approach will be to create a multi-collaborative strategy 
to prevent the spread of Avian Influenza. Recent statistics for the human cases/death from 
the Avian Influenza suggest that primarily countries in Southeast Asia are most affected 
by this virus (WHO, 2009). This may be attributed to over-population, poor hygiene, 
poor handling of poultry and, from a medical perspective to a lack of the availability of 
neuraminidase inhibitors. Most disturbing is that human cases might be transmitted to 
Canadians leaving from countries where infection rates are highest. These same 
Canadians might decide to come back to Canada for a visit, thereby infecting others 
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through global travel or upon their return to Canada. This can lead to an increase in the 
distribution of the disease and may be a precursor to a pandemic. 
Considering such risk of the spread of infectious outbreaks, the following 
recommendations are suggested: 
• Tight monitoring of sea-ships: Programs are in place for airport 
monitoring and other port of entry monitoring of imports of poultry. These 
should be tightened in order to be more effective. If possible poultry from 
other countries should be quarantined at the port of entry until the 
incubation period of Avian flu is over to be sure the birds are not 
harbouring the disease before being released. Travelling by sea,is another 
method of travelling thou not used as often as air. Monitoring travellers or 
ship crews and train crews is very important (Onishchenko, 2006) 
• Media awareness: The media (television, radio, newspapers) has been 
used as form of advertising for commercial products and this has seen rise 
in the purchases of these products. This same approach can be used to 
make awareness of Avian flu and other respiratory infectious diseases. 
The population can be informed of the warning signs to look for in poultry 
and also in humans. They should also be informed of the preventive 
measures against Avian flu listed earlier on. This should be on a 
continuous basis, not only when there is an outbreak. 
• “Health watch of the day”: With the cell phone era, people subscribe to 
jokes of the day, horoscope, and so on. Public health agency of Canada 
can partner with cell phone companies, so that as soon as one wakes up in 
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the morning and turn on their eell phone, they get an educational material 
on medical issues, updates and thinks to watch out for. They can also 
partner with major search engines like Google and Yahoo, for this 
awareness to be made. 
• Community awareness: The community should be informed of the signs 
and symptoms of Avian flu by organizing gatherings at community 
centres,churches public library, schools and other places where people 
normally gather. Those in close contact with poultry should also be well 
informed in the signs to look for in their poultry and to report immediately 
to the CFIA or Health Canada when any abnormal signs are noted in the 
poultry or in humans. 
• Compensation for culled birds: Incentives given to the farmers for culled 
poultry should be good enough as to encourage them to report any 
abnormalities seen in the poultry. 
• Emotional support to farmers: Emotional support should be available to 
farmers whose birds are culled for most of them doing farming love 
animals and become emotionally attached to the poultry, and culling these 
birds brings emotional stress to them. Other farmers will be encouraged to 
report symptoms early if they know they will be supported. 
• Arranging regular workshops for health care professionals to recognize 
signs and symptoms of Avian flu and how to take precautions accordingly. 
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• Arranging “mock” sessions of a pandemic flu in the health care setting and 
seeing how health care workers respond to it, in order to see loopholes in 
the emergency preparedness. 
• Strong national and global collaboration: Developed countries can be as 
prepared as they can both pharmaceutical and non-pharmaceutical means 
but as long as developing countries are not prepared pharmaceutically 
(because they cannot afford stockpiles of anti-viral agents, and also the 
vaccines cannot be produeed in a timely manner) Avian Influenza will still 
be brought into Canada through travelling and international trade. The 
World Health Organization should look for means of utilising global 
resources. Open communication is also critical to fight the Avian flu. The 
virus should also be identified and contained at the source, so that it 
doesn’t become a pandemic. These can only be successful through strong 
national and global collaboration. 
• Research: Research should be ongoing to define the basic transmission 
patterns of Avian Influenza viruses. To date it is not exactly certain how 
poultry to human or human-to-human transmission occurs. Research is the 
only way that will get us ready in ease of antigenic shift and antigenic drift 
of the virus leading to resistant strains. Neuraminidase inhibitors are the 
only anti-virals studied so far to be effective for Avian Influenza. More 
pharmaceutical research should be done to get other drugs that will be 
effective, in the case of drug resistance to neuraminidase inhibitors. 
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• Adherence to the WHO guidelines of Epidemic and Pandemic Alert and 
Response (WHO, 2006c). Health care workers should adhere strictly to 
these guidelines; such as performing hand hygiene before and after any 
patient contact and after contact with contaminated items, whether or not 
gloves are worn and also use standard and droplet precautions when 
providing care for patients with acute, febrile, respiratory illness, 
regardless of whether Avian Influenza infection is suspected. Facial 
protection and hand hygiene are the most critical elements of these 




Canada has a solid system in place to fight viral respiratory infectious diseases, 
with the creation of the Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC), and emergency 
preparedness plans provincially and federally. Despite these plans, some challenges still 
exit that need to be addressed on an ongoing basis. 
The virus by itself is virulent; it undergoes antigenic shift and antigenic drift like 
any other virus, making it difficult to control. On the other hand Canada cannot prevent 
people from travelling for trade or for pleasure. However the government can monitor 
potential high-risk locations for clinical signs and symptoms of potential Influenza 
outbreak. 
Considering the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) and the rapid spread 
of this infectious outbreak globally, the number of cases and mortality, and the speed of 
infection, Canada and the world must be prepared to deal with new and emerging 
outbreaks of infectious diseases to prevent the chance that a pandemic of respiratory 
infections could result. 
A global Influenza pandemic (worldwide spread) may occur if three conditions are 
met (CDC, n.d): 
• A new subtype of Influenza A virus is introduced into the human population. 
• The virus causes serious illness in humans. 
• The virus can spread easily from person to person in a sustained manner. 
Canada might have all the plans in place but as long as the world doesn’t have a 
working globalized preparedness plan, all efforts made by Canada will be futile because 
the virus will still be propagated elsewhere. 
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More research is needed on vaccine production and on developing new 
neuraminidase inhibitors. Likewise the population has to be made aware on an ongoing 
basis about emergency preparedness scenarios to reduce the risk of an emerging 
pandemic. Communication is essential between the WHO, CDC, PHAC, CFIA, and other 
decision makers involved in the prevention of respiratory as well as other types of 
infectious diseases. 
If all these recommendations are followed, Canada will be moving in the right 




Instances of Avian Influenza A virus infections in humans (CDC, n.d) 
Confirmed instances of Avian Influenza A virus infections of humans since 1996 include: 
• H7N7, United Kingdom, 1996: One adult developed conjunctivitis after a piece 
of straw contacted her eye while cleaning a duck house. Low pathogenic Avian 
Influenza A (H7N7) virus was isolated from a conjunctiva specimen. The person 
was not hospitalized and recovered. 
• H5N1, Hong Kong, Special Administrative Region, 1997: Highly pathogenic 
Avian Influenza A (H5N1) virus infections occurred in both poultry and humans. 
This was the first time an Avian Influenza A virus transmission directly from 
birds to humans had been found to cause respiratory illness. During this outbreak, 
18 people were hospitalized and six of them died. To control the outbreak, 
authorities culled about 1.5 million chickens to remove the source of the virus. 
The most significant risk factor for human H5N1 illness was visiting a live 
poultry market in the week before illness onset. 
• H9N2, China and Hong Kong, Special Administrative Region, 1999: Low 
pathogenic Avian Influenza A (H9N2) virus infection was confirmed in two 
hospitalized children and resulted in uncomplicated Influenza-like illness. Both 
patients recovered, and no additional cases were confirmed. The source is 
unknown. Several additional human H9N2 virus infections were reported from 
China in 1998-1999. 
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• H7N2, Virginia, 2002: Following an outbreak of low pathogenic Avian Influenza 
A (H7N2) among poultry in the Shenandoah Valley poultry production area, one 
person developed uncomplicated Influenza-like illness and had serologic evidence 
of infection with H7N2 virus. 
• H5N1, China and Hong Kong, Special Administrative Region, 2003: Two 
cases of highly pathogenic Avian Influenza A (H5N1) virus infection occurred 
among members of a Hong Kong family that had traveled to China. One person 
recovered, the other died. How or where these two family members were infected 
was not determined. Another family member died of a respiratory illness in 
China, but no testing was done. 
• H7N7, Netherlands, 2003: The Netherlands reported outbreaks of highly 
pathogenic Avian Influenza A (H7N7) virus among poultry on multiple farms. 
Overall, 89 people were confirmed to have H7N7 virus infections associated with 
poultry outbreaks. Most human cases occurred among poultry workers. H7N7- 
associated illness was generally mild and included 78 cases of conjunctivitis (eye 
infections); five cases of conjunctivitis and Influenza-like illness with fever, 
cough, and muscle aches; two cases of Influenza-like illness; and four cases that 
were classified as “other.” One death occurred in a veterinarian who visited one of 
the affected farms and developed complications from H7N7 virus infection, 
including acute respiratory distress syndrome. The majority of H7N7 cases 
occurred through direct contact with infected poultry. However, Dutch authorities 
reported three possible instances of human-to-human H7N7 virus transmission 
from poultry workers to family members. 
30 
31 
• H9N2, Hong Kong, Special Administrative Region, 2003: Low pathogenic 
Avian Influenza A (H9N2) virus infection was confirmed in a child in Hong 
Kong. The child was hospitalized with Influenza-like illness and recovered. 
• H7N2, New York, 2003: In November 2003, a patient with serious pre-existing 
medical conditions was admitted to a hospital in New York with respiratory 
symptoms. The patient recovered and went home after a few weeks. Testing 
revealed that the patient had been infected with a low pathogenic Avian Influenza 
A (H7N2) virus; the patient’s underlying medical conditions likely contributed to 
the severity of the patient’s illness. 
• H7N3, Canada, 2004: In March 2004, two poultry workers who were assisting in 
culling operations during a large Influenza A (H7N3) poultry outbreak had 
culture-confirmed H7N3 conjunctivitis, one of whom also had coryza. Both 
poultry workers recovered. One worker was infected with low pathogenic H7N3 
and the other with high pathogenic H7N3. 
• H5N1, China, Thailand and Vietnam, 2003-2004: In late 2003 and early 2004, 
severe and fatal human infections with highly pathogenic Avian Influenza A 
(H5N1) viruses were associated with widespread poultry outbreaks. Most cases 
had pneumonia and many had respiratory failure. Additional human H5N1 cases 
were reported during mid-2004 and late 2004. Most cases appeared to be 
associated with direct contact with sick or dead poultry. One instance of possible, 
limited, human-to-human spread of H5N1 virus is believed to have occurred in 




• H5N1, Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, 2005: Severe and 
fatal human infections with highly pathogenic Avian Influenza A (H5N1) viruses 
were associated with the ongoing H5N1 epizootic among poultry in the region. 
Overall, 98 human H5N1 cases with 43 deaths were reported from five countries. 
• H5N1, Azerbaijan, Cambodia, China, Djibouti, Egypt, Indonesia, Iraq, 
Thailand, Turkey, 2006: Severe and fatal human infections with highly 
pathogenic Avian Influenza A (H5N1) viruses occurred in association with the 
ongoing and expanding epizootic. While most of these cases occurred as a result 
of contact with infected poultry, in Azerbaijan, the most plausible cause of 
exposure to H5N1 in several instances of human infection is thought to be contact 
with infected dead wild birds (swans). The largest family cluster of H5N1 cases to 
date occurred in North Sumatra, Indonesia during May 2006, with seven 
confirmed H5N1 cases and one probable H5N1 case, including seven deaths. 
Overall, 115 human H5N1 cases with 79 deaths were reported in nine countries. 
• H5N1, Cambodia, China, Egypt, Indonesia, Laos, Myanmar, Nigeria, 
Pakistan, Vietnam, 2007: Severe and fatal human infections with highly 
pathogenic Avian Influenza A (H5N1) viruses occurred in association with 
poultry outbreaks. In addition, during 2007, Nigeria (January), Laos (February), 
Myanmar (December), and Pakistan (2007) confirmed their first human infections 
with H5N1. Overall nine countries reported a total of 86 human cases with 59 
deaths in 2007. 
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• H7N2, United Kingdom, 2007: Human infection with low pathogenic Avian 
Influenza A (H7N2) virus resulting in Influenza-like illness and conjunctivitis 
were identified in four hospitalized cases. The cases were associated with an 
H7N2 poultry outbreak in Wales. 
• H9N2, Hong Kong, Special Administrative Region, 2007: In March 2007, low 
pathogenic Avian Influenza A (H9N2) virus infection was confirmed in a 9- 
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